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The reader who attempts a hermeneutic understanding of 
Heidegger's Being and Time (SZ) has traditionally faced two no-
table challenges.' The first is that SZ is an incomplete text; the 
two published divisions represent approximately one third of the 
overall work as it is projected in Heidegger's introduction (SZ 39-
40). The second challenge is that Heidegger published very little 
in the years preceding the appearance of SZ. The primary barom-
eter of his thinking during this period is found in the manuscripts 
of his lecture courses and in his students' notes. Since much of 
this material has only been published in the last twenty years, ac-
cess to this work has historically been limited. 
These lacunae have made it difficult to situate SZ both within 
the context of Heidegger's early thought, and relative to the ques-
tion which guides his entire philosophical endeavor—namely the 
Seinsfrage or the question of the meaning of Being. This is the 
question with which Heidegger begins his investigation in SZ (SZ 
2-19), and it is meant to frame the discussion in the extant two 
divisions dealing with the Being of Dasein. Due to the incomplete 
nature of the text, however, it is easy to overlook that this discus-
sion of Dasein is to be understood against the horizon of the 
Seinsfrage. Moreover, in the absence of further evidence of 
Heidegger's thinking leading up to this point, there is little to re-
mind the reader of Heidegger's concern with the Seinsfrage during 
this period of his philosophical development. 
These factors have fostered two general tendencies in tradi-
tional Heidegger interpretation. First, the observation is often made 
that Heidegger's early work is concerned with the Being of Dasein 
while his later work deals with Being in a broader sense. This 
view de-emphasizes the continuity in Heidegger's early and later 
thoughts and seems untenable upon consideration of Heidegger's 
early lecture courses which make it clear that Being was an early 
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philosophical preoccupation.^ The lack of attention to the impor-
tance of the Seinsfiage in Heidegger's early work contributes to a 
second tendency, namely a decontextualization of SZ relative to 
this question. That is, the two published divisions are often inter-
preted independent of the inquiry into the Seinsfiage which frames 
them. The result of such a move is that SZ is often interpreted as a 
text of existentialism—a position which has serious implications 
for how Heidegger's concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity 
come to be understood. It is with these concepts and their relation-
ship to Dasein's subjectivity that I am primarily concerned. 
In recent years, with the publication of an increasing number 
of the lecture courses from the 1920s and early 1930s, the larger 
context of Heidegger's philosophical endeavor during this period 
is becoming more apparent. Important work on these early texts is 
being done which illustrates not only the unity of Heidegger's 
thought, but also the enormous impact that the thinkers most influ-
ential for him at the time—including Aristotle, Dilthey, Husserl, 
and Augustine—have had on his worM This more recent scholar-
ship not only tends to undermine the position which would strongly 
separate the early Heidegger from the later Heidegger, it also pro-
vides a richer context for understanding SZ itself. Nevertheless, 
the textual specificity of SZ has not been re-examined in the light 
of the new material we now have at our disposal. 
Clearly, a detailed re-interpretation of Heidegger's text is a 
task that belongs to a much larger project. My aim here is to pro-
pose a way of rethinking the concepts of authenticity and 
inauthenticity in relation to Dasein's subjectivity in light of 
Heidegger's critical engagement with Husserl's phenomenology, 
as documented in his 1925 lecture course, The History of the Con-
cept of Time. To this end, I have structured the paper in three parts. 
The first outlines the traditional existentialist interpretation of au-
thenticity and inauthenticity and its more sophisticated contempo-
rary counterpart, the voluntarist interpretation. The second part 
considers Heidegger's analysis of the contributions of phenom-
enology as represented in HCT and the significance of the 
Seinsfrage. In the third, I discuss the importance of HCT for our 
understanding of SZ and in particular for our understanding of the 
concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity. 
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I 
The first two divisions of SZ are commonly referred to as the 
"Dasein analytic" or "existential analytic" because they inquire into 
the Being of the entity called Dasein. Dasein is distinct from other 
entities in that its Being is an issue for it [geht um]; that is, it bears 
a relationship to its Being, and this comportment toward its own 
Being is constitutive of what it is to be Dasein (SZ 12). This gives 
rise to two features which are ontologically distinctive of Dasein. 
Firstly, Dasein's essence lies in its existence; secondly, its Being is 
characterized by "mineness" [Jemeinigkeit] (SZ 42). The first fea-
ture indicates that the essence of the entity Dasein does not lie 
outside of or prior to its existence but is in fact constituted by that 
existence. The relationship to its Being which is constitutive of 
Dasein can only be enacted existentially—Dasein's existence con-
stitutes its Being. The second feature indicates that Dasein is not 
indifferent to its Being but rather views its Being as belonging to 
it; thus Dasein's Being is something personal.5 The term "Dasein" 
literally means "Dasein", a Being-there, signifying that in its Be-
ing, Dasein is always already situated. This is why Dasein's Being 
is known as a Being-in-the-world/> This situatedness pertains to 
the two ontologically constitutive features just described. To say 
that Dasein's essence lies in its existence is to say that its existence 
in a concrete situation (its there) is constitutive. To say that this 
Being is always mine is to say that it always belongs to someone— 
to a concrete, identifiable, existing entity. Although the term 
"Dasein" is also used to designate a particular entity, it is more 
appropriate to say that "Dasein" names the Being which belongs 
to that entity and which never is except in that entity. 
In the first division, Heidegger discusses Dasein in its every-
dayness, often understood as its inauthenticity.7 In the second he 
discusses Dasein's becoming authentic, where inauthenticity is 
Dasein's Being in the mode of not-Being itself and authenticity is 
its Being in the mode of Being itself. This paradoxical formula-
tion is not exclusive to Heidegger but is shared with traditional 
philosophical reflections on alienation and its overcoming, as well 
as on the differences between the modes of being which pertain to 
potentiality or possibility and actuality.8 How one understands 
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authenticity and inauthenticity in more concrete terms, however, 
depends a great deal upon how one understands this self which 
Dasein can both be and not-be. 
The existentialist reading picks up on Heidegger's use of the 
language of existentialism and largely interprets the text through a 
theoretical framework defined by the catchphrase "existence pre-
cedes essence". 9 This slogan expresses the existentialist view that 
human beings exist first, and only out of this existence do they 
construct their essence. Thus, the fact that they exist is contingent 
and something for which they are not responsible, but who or what 
they are is something they create themselves. This is in opposition 
to other philosophical positions which maintain that essence is prior 
to material existence. So, the existentialist reads the two constitu-
tive features of Dasein in the following terms: that Dasein's es-
sence lies in its existence is understood to mean that Dasein cre-
ates its essence through its existence, that it is the author of its 
Being; that Dasein's Being is in every case mine is taken to mean 
that since this Being which I create is mine, I am the author of it 
and so am responsible for it. In this view, inauthenticity amounts 
to avoiding responsibility for one's own self-creation, to renounc-
ing authorship and allowing others to assume that role. The classic 
example is that of unreflectively allowing social norms and prac-
tices to dictate one's behavior and activity. Authenticity, on the 
other hand, would involve renouncing the domination of others 
and assuming responsibility for oneself. The existentialist under-
standing of Dasein is implicit in those interpretations which main-
tain that, in inauthenticity, Dasein is dominated by others (das Man) 
and that to achieve authenticity Dasein must pull itself away from 
das Man and take charge of its existence. That Dasein alone can 
be responsible for its existence is said to be revealed to it in its 
Being-towards-death, which reveals its finitude and the fact that 
only Dasein can live its life. 1 0 
The central point in the existentialist interpretation which I 
find particularly problematic is the association of inauthenticity 
with Dasein's Being-with others (Mitsein), and the overcoming of 
this inauthentic dependence with a radical individuation and ap-
propriation of Dasein's mineness in Being-towards-death." This 
view somewhat overstates the tension between Mitsein and Being-
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towards-death, and does not adequately take into consideration the 
role of Dasein's historicality in authenticity. More recent scholar-
ship has argued against this existentialist reading largely on tex-
tual grounds, claiming that the complexity of the relationship be-
tween authenticity and inauthenticity has not been appropriately 
understood and that the role of Dasein's Being-with others as an 
essential existential structure has been blurred. 1 2 The existentialist 
position reverses the traditional priority of essence and existence, 
and in reading Heidegger through this rubric, maintains that Dasein 
is responsible for creating its Being or essence. However, Heidegger 
does not share this view. He maintains that Dasein's essence is its 
existence. Rather than reversing the priority of essence over exist-
ence, he collapses the distinction. Dasein does not create its es-
sence; its essence is its Being-Dasein, and this essence is some-
thing which it cannot choose; rather Dasein is burdened with it. 
Once having come into existence, Dasein must take over the task 
of that existence and become responsible for its Being, but it is 
never absolutely responsible for it. In becoming authentic, Dasein 
does not disentangle itself from its history and from others in order 
to become its own foundation. Rather, it makes its existence its 
own by allowing itself to be appropriated by that which conditions 
it. The existentialist reading ascribes to Dasein a capacity to create 
its own foundations—which Heidegger is at pains to demonstrate 
it does not have—and consequently characterizes authenticity in 
terms which are somewhat misleading. The result is a failure to 
capture the extent to which Dasein's subjectivity differs from the 
theories of subjectivity which precede it and from which Heidegger 
strives to differentiate himself (SZ 114-17, 317-23). 
A similar difficulty is to be found in another, more nuanced 
approach to Heidegger's text which I will call the "voluntarist read-
ing." Unlike the existentialist reading, the voluntarist position ac-
knowledges that there are aspects of Dasein's existence which 
condition it and determine its essence as Dasein, and it grants that 
Dasein cannot be self-founding in the way that the existentialists 
maintain. In this sense, the voluntarist reading reflects a more care-
ful understanding of Heidegger's text. The central claim of the 
voluntarist position is that authenticity is achieved through an act 
of the will, which is located in Dasein's resolution to be open to 
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appropriating its Being and becoming its foundation in its "want-
ing to have a conscience" (SZ 295-301). The most notable propo-
nent of this view is Michael Zimmerman, who identifies this mo-
ment of voluntarism in Heidegger's text in order to support the 
claim that Heidegger's early work remains imbedded in a fairly 
traditional conception of the subject as agent, albeit a situated and 
conditioned one. He maintains that this conception of the subject 
is only overcome in the later work.' 3 
Since the voluntarist interpretation reads Dasein's self prima-
rily in terms of agency and the exercise of the will, it views the 
ontologically constitutive features of Dasein's Being in similar 
terms. That Dasein's essence lies in its existence is understood in 
terms of activity: Dasein's essence lies in its willing. Furthermore, 
its mineness is to be associated with the fact that who it is, is to be 
determined by what it wills. This understanding of subjectivity 
stresses the same self-creation which characterizes the existential-
ist reading. Both readings emphasize a subjectivity in which au-
thentic activity originates in the subject and is directed outward 
towards objects. Inauthenticity, by contrast, would be character-
ized by a certain passivity or inactivity. 
The existentialist and voluntarist readings, then, share a par-
ticular view of subjectivity as agency which is enacted through the 
subject's exercising its will. Heidegger's notion of resoluteness 
[Entschlossenheit] is generally cited as the justification for this 
interpretation. I would, however, argue against placing undue 
emphasis on the role of the will in Heidegger's account of authen-
tic subjectivity because that subjectivity is defined in terms of both 
active and passive moments. Although he claims that resoluteness 
is only phenomenologically given in a resolution, it is nevertheless 
distinguishable from a resolution—a decision or act of the will 
(SZ 298). Resoluteness is wanting to have a conscience [Gewissen-
haben-wollen], and this is an authentic disclosedness of Dasein.' 4 
Wanting to have a conscience is similarly ambiguously active and 
passive. One cannot will to have a conscience because the call of 
conscience is not chosen: "Indeed the call is precisely something 
which we ourselves have neither planned nor prepared for nor vol-
untarily performed, nor have we ever done so. 'It ' calls, against 
our expectations and even against our will" (SZ 275). One can at 
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most be open to hearing the call. 1 5 The hearing of the call or ap-
peal is a disclosedness which depends upon finding oneself called, 
as well as understanding that one is called. Dasein's potentiality-
for-Being, its Seinkönnen, is attested through the call of conscience, 
and throughout his discussion of this phenomenon, Heidegger 
emphasizes what we might call the "middle-voicedness" of this 
disclosure: an ambiguity between active and passive moments. 1 6 
This ambiguity is evident throughout his treatment of hearing and 
listening, as well as in the specific claim that Dasein lets itself be 
called forth to its ownmost possibility.'7 To be sure, Dasein chooses 
itself (SZ 287), but the passive constructions that Heidegger uses 
throughout these passages suggest that this choosing must be un-
derstood within a context in which Dasein is also, as it were, cho-
sen. Thus, we cannot read resoluteness purely in terms of an act of 
the will. Dasein achieves authenticity at least as much through its 
openness to being appropriated by its possibilities and to being 
drawn into a situation. 
It is problematic to attribute to Dasein a subjectivity founded 
on agency and the will, as both the existentialist and the volunta-
rist readings do, because it is not clear that Heidegger's account of 
disclosedness in general and the authentic disclosedness of Dasein 
in particular fully corroborates this interpretation. In my view, 
greater appreciation of the more complicated account of subjectiv-
ity which he offers can be gained through increased attention to his 
work as a phenomenological project and to the importance of this 
project for understanding Dasein's subjectivity. 
The inquiry of SZ must be situated within a broader philo-
sophical context, specifically that of Heidegger's engagement with 
Husserl's phenomenology. The key to Heidegger's critique of 
Husserl lies in his thematization of the Seinsfiage. When we come 
to understand why this question is so important for Heidegger, as 
well as the nature of its relation to the Dasein analytic, we will 
approach a deeper understanding of the subjectivity which belongs 
to Dasein, both in its authenticity and in its inauthenticity. We will 
come to understand Dasein's Being in terms of intentionality. 
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II 
Heidegger's complex relationship to Husserl is most explic-
itly articulated in HCT, the 1925 lecture course in which Heidegger 
directly addresses Husserl and the phenomenological tradition. In 
this text, the Seinsfrage is introduced against the background of a 
more extended discussion of the contributions and shortcomings 
of phenomenology. In particular, Heidegger is concerned with the 
necessity of submitting intentionality to phenomenological analy-
sis. The sections of HCT where he pursues this endeavor closely 
resemble large sections of SZ, and indeed, HCT is generally seen 
as a draft of SZ. 1 8 For this reason, the text provides a useful point 
of mediation between the language of phenomenology and inten-
tionality, and the more specifically Heideggerian language of SZ. ' 9 
Husserl is concerned with the problem of knowledge which 
traditionally focuses on the correlation between real things in the 
world and our ideas of them. In such a schema, truth lies in a 
correspondence between reality, or the physical world, and what 
we know, or the psychic domain. One must then have a theory of 
how it is possible for such a resemblance to be effected through the 
mediation of the senses. The empiricist argues that data from sen-
sations are assembled by the understanding into representations 
from which ideas can be reached through a process of abstraction. 
Husserl argues against this view in Logical Investigations in his 
critique of psychologism.2" Alternatively, one might adopt an ide-
alist approach, as exemplified for instance by Kant. To a certain 
degree this position can be seen to sidestep the problem by deny-
ing that knowledge is or ought to be of noumena. Kant maintains 
that we cannot have knowledge of the things in themselves, but 
only as they appear to consciousness, only in so far as they are 
phenomena. Husserl agrees that we can only have knowledge of 
phenomena, and he further insists that the only meaningful under-
standing of "the thing itself is the phenomenon in the first place. 
Hence, he is not particularly worried about the inaccessibility of 
the noumenon. However, Husserl does not seem to agree with 
Kant's view that the categories through which the understanding 
grasps objects are projected or brought to bear by consciousness in 
the way that Kant suggests. Rather he maintains that phenomena 
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already show themselves in terms of these categories, as confirmed 
by our experience in apprehending objects. In this way, he hopes 
to combat the claim that knowledge in an idealist framework is 
subjective, not objective. In some sense we can think of Husserl's 
phenomenology as an attempt to negotiate a position between em-
piricism and idealism. 
In Heidegger's view, phenomenology has made three impor-
tant philosophical contributions: intentionality, categorial intuition, 
and a particular understanding of the a priori. Intentionality is 
always a directedness towards an intentional object, and this "di-
rectedness towards" is the structure of lived experience; it is im-
mediate (HCT 30). The intentional object is not a physical object 
"out there" in the world which the subject must apprehend and 
bring within its interiority as knowledge; rather, the intentional 
object is a phenomenon. It shows itself as what it is in its Being; it 
gives meaning. What I experience in lived reality are not brute 
objects, but objects that have significance. Intentionality is my 
comportment toward these objects relative to their significance and 
meaning. 
In the sixth of his Logical Investigations, Husserl asks about 
meaning: where does it lie? how is it given? He identifies two 
general groups of acts—expressive acts and intuitive acts—and 
determines that meaning lies in neither the one nor the other, but in 
the unity of both. Expressive acts (such as judgments) refer to 
some meaning; they are referential or signifying, a projection from 
the subject toward an object. Intuitive acts are acts of apprehen-
sion in which the object gives some sort of meaning to the subject. 
The directionality of the intuitive act is opposite to that of the ex-
pressive act. Both types of acts, however, bear a relationship to 
meaning: both give meaning [sinngebend]. 
Most of the acts with which we typically associate meaning 
are expressive acts. Taken on their own, however, these acts are 
merely empty intentions because they refer to objects without those 
objects necessarily being intuitively, and therefore immediately, 
given. Heidegger's example is a conversational reference to some 
object—a bridge in Marburg. In so far as one merely refers to the 
bridge without an explicit intuitive apprehension of it, the inten-
tion remains empty. However, the meaning expressed in the empty 
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intention can be confirmed through an intuitive act. Such an attes-
tation fulfills the intention by providing evidence for it in a more 
immediate way. The intuitive act, in giving more immediately what 
is presumed in the expressive act, demonstrates the truth of the 
expression (HCT 49). 2 1 One way in which this empty intention of 
the bridge can be fulfilled is by conjuring up a mental image of the 
bridge; still another way is by actually standing before the bridge 
and perceiving it. In the first case, the bridge is self-given, given 
in its Being. In the second, it is bodily given as well as self-given 
(HCT 41). There are many different kinds of intentions; each con-
tains a particular tendency toward fulfillment which is related to 
the nature of the intention: i.e. perception is fulfilled through per-
ception, feeling through feeling, and so on (HCT 44). It is impor-
tant to emphasize that Heidegger views intentionality as the struc-
ture of lived experience; thus, when intentions are fulfilled—that 
is, when evidence is provided for them through an act of intuition— 
this fulfillment is experienced as lived (HCT 48-50). 
The intuition which fulfills the empty intention of an expres-
sive act is categorial intuition, a form of "seeing" that belongs to 
intentionality but which should not be confused with simple per-
ception. Simple perception is associated with sensory input, and 
categorial intuition is a "second order" intuition because it is 
founded upon simple perception. 2 2 Since expressive acts express 
the meaning or Being of an object, an intuition which fulfills such 
an act must be an intuition of meaning or Being. But simple per-
ception cannot perceive meaning or Being because neither is ac-
cessible to mere sensation. Consequently, an intuition capable of 
fulfilling such an intention must be something more than simple 
perception: this is categorial intuition. 2 3 That Being is intuitively 
given, as opposed to subjectively projected, importantly establishes 
the objectivity of Being despite the fact that it is not accessible to 
simple perception. 2 4 
The problem categorial intuition is intended to resolve might 
be made clearer by way of example. Normally we maintain that 
the truth of a particular assertion can be verified by checking the 
evidence given through perception. So, the statement, "the chair is 
yellow" is verified by looking at the chair in question to see if, in 
fact, it is yellow. But the statement "the chair is yellow" asserts 
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the Being-yellow of the chair, whereas sensory perception does not 
perceive the Being-yellow, but only the yellow. Technically then, 
perception cannot provide the evidence necessary to prove the truth 
of the assertion. So where does one find the evidence for the Be-
/ng-yellow? Is it merely something that we subjectively project 
onto the object? No. Both Husserl and Heidegger maintain that 
just because the Being-yellow of the chair cannot be verified by 
the senses does not mean that Being-yellow is merely a subjective 
quality. The Being-yellow of the chair has an objectivity, which is 
provided through categorial intuition founded upon simple percep-
tion. 
Through categorial intuition, objects are given as meaningful 
wholes; these meaningful wholes provide evidence for the various 
acts of signification that we perform. 2 5 Philosophy has tradition-
ally characterized the distinction between simple perception and 
categorial intuition by means of the standard differentiation be-
tween sensibility and understanding, or matter and form. Accord-
ing to Heidegger, these characterizations miss the point of categorial 
intuition as intuition. Categories are precisely not added on to sense 
perceptions by the subject but are intuited, given by the objects 
themselves (HCT 70-71): that is, the categories in terms of which 
objects of intuitive acts appear, are given in intuition. They need 
not be directly and explicitly accessible, however. They may only 
become apparent as categories through a series of phenomenologi-
cal reductions which strip away the intuitive content of the act to 
leave behind the ideative structure. 2 6 
In so far as these categories shape the meaning which is intu-
itively given in any particular apprehension, they are still a priori 
and objective. Traditionally, the a priori which pertains to the cat-
egories has been understood as prior to all experience—and thus 
absolute in some sense or located in pure subjectivity or conscious-
ness independent of objective, empirical experience. As we have 
seen, however, categorial intuition shifts the location of the cat-
egories from something provided by the understanding to some-
thing given by the object through intuition. However, it is impor-
tant to note that categories are not to be found in the object as 
given through simple perception. In so far as what is given in an 
act of categorial intuition can be taken as evidence for various ex-
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pressive acts or acts of signification, this implies that acts of 
categorial intuition occur in terms which correspond to those of 
acts of expression. In fact, Heidegger maintains that we tend to 
"see" and understand things as they have already been "seen," ex-
pressed, and understood (HCT 56). Although the categories im-
plied in categorial intuition are prior to any given experience, they 
are not absolutely prior (HCT 72-75).2? 
Despite the contributions of phenomenology with respect to 
intentionality, categorial intuition, and the a priori, Heidegger 
maintains that it has failed to submit the Being of intentionality to 
analysis. Specifically, phenomenology has not sought to lay bare 
its own possibility—the Being of phenomena at all, the Being of 
intentionality which makes phenomena possible, or the Being of 
the entity who is intentional. HusserFs approach is to exact a se-
ries of reductions in which successive facets of lived experience 
are bracketed in order to reach the essence of the intentional ob-
ject. 2 8 The purpose of this bracketing is to make the entity show 
itself in its Being (HCT 99); this occurs in two reductive moments. 
The first is the transcendental reduction in which my immersion in 
the stream of life experiences is bracketed so that I can now attend 
to the structure of those experiences. The second is the eidetic 
reduction in which the concretia of experiences are bracketed, strip-
ping away that which makes them individual and particular, to leave 
only their ideative structure (HCT 100). What is left is the pure 
field of consciousness (HCT 100). 
Heidegger's question to Husserl's phenomenology is: Does the 
concept of the pure field of consciousness address the question of 
the Being of consciousness at all? Heidegger thinks it does not. 
According to Heidegger, Husserl never submits consciousness to 
phenomenological scrutiny, although the Being of consciousness 
is presupposed by all of his investigations. The result is that his 
phenomenology is not properly grounded (HCT 108). For 
Heidegger, some of Husserl's reductions are problematic because 
they bracket aspects of the phenomenon of consciousness which 
are actually essential to it. 
In the reduction we disregard precisely the reality 
of the consciousness given in the natural attitude 
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in the factual human being. The real experience is 
suspended as real in order to arrive at the pure 
absolute experience. The sense of the reduction is 
precisely to make no use of the reality of the in-
tentional; it is not posited and experienced as real. 
We start from the real consciousness in the factu-
ally existing human, but this takes place only in 
order finally to disregard it and to dismiss the re-
ality of consciousness as such. In its methodologi-
cal sense as a disregarding, then, the reduction is 
in principle inappropriate for determining the be-
ing of consciousness positively. The sense of the 
reduction involves precisely giving up the ground 
upon which alone the question of the being of the 
intentional could be based (admittedly with the aim 
of then determining the sense of this reality from 
the region now secured). (HCT 109) 
Husserl's reductions remove the immediacy of intentional experi-
ence, most importantly with respect to its mineness (HCT 109). In 
abstracting away all that individuates experience, one is left with 
intentional acts only in terms of their "what"-content; how inten-
tional acts are in terms of being the structure of lived experience is 
thus overlooked. 2 9 That which makes the experience lived—namely 
the existence of an intentional comportment on the part of some 
existing entity toward some specific object—is precisely what is 
taken out of account (HCT 110). Yet Husserl emphasizes this start-
ing point in lived experience in maintaining that the intentional 
does not pertain to a relation between psychic and physical reality. 
Heidegger concludes that phenomenology to date has neglected 
two important questions: first, the question of the Being of inten-
tionality; and second, the question of the meaning [Sinn] of Being 
itself (HCT 115). The first asks what it is to be intentional. Inten-
tionality only occurs in the entity which is intentional, namely 
Dasein. Thus, if we want to understand intentionality as the struc-
ture of lived experience, we must examine Dasein and the struc-
tures of its lived experience—what Heidegger in SZ will term its 
existentiality.M The second question involves the meaning or sense 
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of Being. What do we mean when we talk about Being? In what 
sense do we understand it? 3 ' According to Heidegger, the pursuit 
of the question of the meaning of Being requires a phenomeno-
logical inquiry into the Being of the entity to whom Being becomes 
manifest; this entity is Dasein. Furthermore, it requires an inquiry 
into this entity with particular attention to those structures through 
which Being becomes manifest; this is Dasein's intentionality. Thus, 
the answer to the second question is to be sought in the answer to 
the first. 
Ill 
Heidegger begins SZ with the following words: 
Do we in our time have an answer to the question 
of what we really mean by the word "being"? Not 
at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the 
question of the meaning of Being. But are we 
nowadays even perplexed at our inability to un-
derstand the expression "Being"? Not at all. So 
first of all we must reawaken an understanding for 
the meaning of this question. Our aim in the fol-
lowing treatise is to work out the question of the 
meaning of Being and to do so concretely. Our 
provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the 
possible horizon for any understanding whatso-
ever of Being. (SZ 1) 
In this passage and in the text which follows, Heidegger stresses 
that the Seinsfrage is the question with which he is concerned, yet 
he says remarkably little about its significance.3 2 It is in this re-
gard that HCT is extremely helpful and provides important back-
ground to Heidegger's point of departure in SZ. 
It is clear that in Heidegger's view an analysis of Dasein's Being 
is necessary in order to get at the meaning of Being. But why? 
Heidegger maintains that an implicit understanding of Being is 
operative in intentional comportment: it is presumed in every en-
counter, in every assertion, in every expression, in every use of the 
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"is". Dasein understands Being much in the same way that empty 
intentions refer to the meanings which they express: it understands 
Being without grasping Being. And since intentionality is the struc-
ture of lived experience, this proto-understanding of Being is op-
erative in Dasein's existence; indeed it is an integral part of it. 
Heidegger believes an examination of Dasein's Being, and the struc-
tures of its existence, will be instructive in illuminating the mean-
ing of Being because he believes that he can expose the under-
standing of Being with which Dasein always already operates 
through a fulfillment of Dasein's empty intention of its own Being. 
Heidegger's point will be that Dasein understands its own Be-
ing, not in terms of substance, but in terms of temporality. Dasein 
understands itself as finite, finite in the sense of being mortal, of 
being limited with respect to time. Upon establishing this, 
Heidegger will examine Dasein's everyday way of understanding 
itself in order to demonstrate that it is actually temporal in origin. 
He will also go to lengths to demonstrate that the very sense of 
Being as substance, as presence-at-hand, is also derivative of tem-
porality—specifically of the temporal mode of the present. 
Heidegger will argue that the sense of Being which underlies 
Dasein's understanding of its own Being and the Being of objects 
is not space but time. To prove this, Heidegger must pursue an 
analysis of Dasein's Being. He must show how Dasein under-
stands its own Being, not only in everydayness—where Dasein 
only emptily intends its Being—but also in authenticity where what 
is only indeterminately understood in everydayness is more fully 
grasped. My suggestion is that the first two divisions of SZ aim to 
accomplish this task. 
If Dasein is an entity whose Being is an issue for it, then it 
always comports itself toward its Being in one way or another; its 
Being is always an intentional object for it. In everydayness, Dasein 
comports itself towards its own Being in the manner of an empty 
intention; it refers to itself purely expressively. To experience the 
truth of its Being, Dasein would require evidence of that truth. 
Such evidence could only be given in an intuitive act. Such an 
intuitive act occurs when Dasein's Being is brought before it and 
apprehended in its anxious Being-towards-death. Here, Dasein 
experiences its Being in the most immediate fashion, the empty 
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intentionality which characterizes Dasein's everydayness is ful-
filled, and Dasein becomes authentic. In SZ Heidegger goes to 
lengths to show that Dasein's inauthenticity is always a privative 
mode of its authentic Being-in-the-world and to illustrate that ev-
ery "fallen" way of Being-Dasein is actually a way of Being-Dasein 
but only in the mode of not-Being it. It is not its Being in the sense 
that in inauthenticity [Uneigentlichkeit] Dasein's Being is not its 
own, or it is not the Being which is most proper to it. 3 3 These 
claims substantiate the view that both authenticity and inauthenticity 
have the same intentional object—namely Dasein's Being—but 
that in authenticity that intention is full (Dasein is its Being), while 
in inauthenticity it is empty (Dasein is not its Being). 3 4 
Since the language of intentionality found in HCT is not par-
ticularly apparent in SZ, how can we substantiate this view? 
Heidegger does not begin the opening passages of SZ with the 
claim that Dasein is the entity which is intentional, but rather that 
Dasein is the entity who questions (SZ 7). He further states that all 
questioning has the following structure: there is always something 
asked about, someone or something interrogated, and something 
one hopes to find out by asking (SZ 5). In the case of the Seinsfrage, 
the entity who asks the question is the same as the entity queried, 
namely Dasein, because it is Dasein who has an indeterminate un-
derstanding of Being as part of its Being. 3 5 
The whole discussion at the opening of SZ, which occurs in 
terms of questioning, closely resembles those sections in HCT in 
which Heidegger offers an analysis of the structure of the question 
and its relationship to "the questioning entity (Dasein)" (HCT 144-
48). In HCT these passages follow Heidegger's discussion of 
phenomenology's neglect of the Seinsfrage and the Being of inten-
tionality. The concern with questioning, then, is not isolated to 
SZ, but is bound up with issues raised in HCT, issues which are 
articulated in the language of intentionality. 
More importantly, Heidegger maintains in HCT that the entity 
who is intentional has an indeterminate understanding of Being 
which is presumed in every intentional comportment in which it 
understands the Being of its intentional object; this understanding 
is given in an indeterminate way in questioning. 3 6 Heidegger re-
peats this idea in SZ when he claims that all questions contain within 
DASEIN'S FULFILLMENT 51 
them an indeterminate understanding of that about which they ask 
(SZ 5-6). Such an understanding is necessary in order to even 
formulate the question, to seek anything at all. The understanding 
must be indeterminate, however, otherwise it would not be neces-
sary to ask the question; one would already have the answer. Ques-
tions, then, reflect a proto-understanding of that about which they 
ask, which resembles the indeterminate "comprehension" of the 
intentional object exhibited by an empty intention. 
Questions, we may say, are fulfilled, not simply by any response 
whatsoever, but by the response which conforms in a particular 
way to the question which elicits it. Some responses answer the 
question; others do not; the potential of a particular response to be 
an answer lies in the question to which it responds. Indeed, it is the 
proto-understanding of that about which the question asks that 
allows the questioner to have a sense of whether or not the question 
has been answered. The relationship between question and response 
is not unlike that already noted between empty and fulfilled 
intentions. The empty intention points at something which is given 
through the intuitive act which fulfills it; only when this evidence 
is given can the truth of the expressive act be seen in a positive 
light. Moreover, the original expressive act contains within it the 
possibility of its fulfillment, in the sense that it sets the parameters 
for the particular intuitions which may fulfill it. Although Heidegger 
does not explicitly refer to the response which Dasein receives to 
its questioning, one can understand the attestation provided by what 
is given in the call of conscience as evidence to support this view 
(SZ 267-301). Indeed, the phenomenon of conscience can be seen 
as proof of the fact that Dasein is always questioning itself, even if 
only implicitly. The call of conscience brings Dasein before itself 
in its anxious Being-towards-death because in conscience Dasein 
calls itself to itself. Dasein is "summoned to itself—that is, to its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being" (SZ 273), and this is done by the 
caller who, it turns out, is Dasein's Self," but a self which Dasein 
is not in its everydayness. 1 8 Heidegger makes it clear that the call 
of conscience is the mechanism by which Dasein's "potentiality-
for-Being-its-Self," which it already is as a possibility, is attested 
(SZ 268). In this attestation, Dasein's Being is authentically 
disclosed. It thus represents a fulfillment of the intention which 
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constitutes Dasein's everydayness. It is important to recognize 
here that this fulfillment does not imply completion, since Dasein's 
Being is one of openness and possibility. A fulfillment of its 
intention of itself exposes Dasein to this openness in an immediate 
fashion. Such a fulfillment is Dasein's authenticity. 
Dasein is the entity for whom its Being is an issue. It bears a 
relationship to its Being, which means that its Being is an intentional 
object for it, and this manifests itself in the very structures of 
Dasein's existentiality. But that Dasein's Being is an issue for it 
also implies that Dasein is concerned with its existence; its existence 
matters to it, which is why it asks about it. To say that Dasein's 
essence lies in its existence is to say that this concern with its Being, 
this asking about it, is worked out in its very existing. Dasein's 
existence and the structures thereof demonstrate this concern with 
its Being. To say that Dasein's Being is always characterized by 
mineness—that it is always in every case mine—means that every 
factical entity whose Being is Dasein is concerned with its Being, 
with its existence, and that the factical specificity of this concern 
and the questioning which produces it are essential. As we have 
seen above, Heidegger appears to be responding directly to Husserl, 
who reduced intentional acts to a level of abstraction which obscured 
the fact that intentionality is experienced personally in the 
immediacy of lived experience. If Dasein's self is intentional 
according to the structures of its existentiality, then authenticity 
and inauthenticity must pertain to ways of Being this intentional 
self in modes of Being and not-Being it, respectively. As I have 
already noted, in inauthenticity Dasein is its intentionality in the 
mode of not-Being it, namely in an empty and merely referential 
fashion. In authenticity, Dasein is its intentionality in the mode of 
Being it, in the way of a fulfilled intention. 
In the existentialist view the self creates its essence through 
the process of its existing; it is the author of its essence. 
Inauthenticity would be giving this responsibility over to another; 
authenticity would be to assume it oneself. The voluntarist view is 
similar, except that it focuses on the exercise of the will. In both 
cases, what distinguishes authenticity from inauthenticity is 
something which comes from the self, the subject, and which 
projects outward onto the world, appropriating it in some way or 
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another. But the directionality associated with the intentional self 
is somewhat different. The act of expression or signification, which 
is outward in its orientation, is a feature of both authenticity and 
inauthenticity. In authenticity evidence is provided for the 
intentional "object" through intuition; the intentional emptiness of 
subjective expression is fulfilled by the intuited object. Intuition, 
understood phenomenologically, does not have the same uni-
directionality as the projection associated with agency in the 
existentialist-voluntarist accounts. Categorial intuition, as we have 
stressed above, is not a function of subjectivity projecting something 
onto the object. It is the objective giving itself of the object; it is 
founded upon simple perception. Consequently, the intention is 
fulfilled (and authenticity achieved) not through a subjective act of 
the will, but through a more passive reception of the object as it 
gives itself to categorial intuition. What fulfills the intention comes 
not from the self, but from the other. This holds true in the paradigm 
of questioning as well, where the response which fulfills the 
question comes from the other. 3 9 
If Dasein is defined as the entity for whom its Being is an 
issue, this definition must apply to Dasein in any of its modes. 
Dasein is concerned with and asks about its Being in both 
authenticity and inauthenticity. What differentiates them is whether 
the response that is given really answers the question, whether it 
really provides that which the question seeks. We must remember 
that the understanding of what one is asking about—which guides 
the questioning—is rather indeterminate and vague. Often a sense 
of clarity regarding the question is only apparent after the question 
has been answered; the sense that a particular response is adequate 
often sheds a great deal of light on what the question was really 
about. The questioning in which Dasein is engaged in its existence 
shares in this characteristic; that Dasein questions is often apparent 
only in the sense of fulfillment which accompanies the receiving 
of an adequate response. This sense of fulfillment is the feature 
which definitively distinguishes authenticity and inauthenticity. 
The central issue for Heidegger in both SZ and HCT is the 
Seinsfrage, and hence it is worth pausing to reflect on this very 
question. It is one thing to understand the Dasein analytic formally 
relative to the question which lies behind it, but we should also 
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consider it in terms of its significance. Heidegger maintains that 
the philosophical tradition by and large has failed to question Being 
qua Being. Because the tradition has tended to understand Being 
exclusively in terms of beings, or entities, Being is not viewed as 
an issue worthy of questioning; it simply has not appeared 
questionable. 
What this implies is that we have not found ourselves to be 
questioned by Being; it has not shown itself (explicitly at least) as 
an enigma, as something whose meaning is in question. The 
questionableness of something throws itself back on the one to 
whom it appears questionable, thereby challenging her to ask the 
question and to seek an answer. The experience of being challenged 
points to the openness of that entity, Dasein, to being questioned 
and to being able to question. Dasein is the only entity for whom 
the Seinsfrage is a possibility because it is the only entity which 
bears a relationship to its Being. In this sense, it has priority over 
other entities. 4 0 The Seinsfrage itself has a certain priority relative 
to other questions: ontologically, because of its importance with 
respect to other types of inquiry; and ontically, because of its 
importance in Dasein's existence. 4 1 
Because of Dasein's ontic and ontological priority, its Being is 
a point of access into the question of the meaning of Being; 
fundamental ontology must be sought through the existential 
analytic of Dasein (SZ 13). Dasein asks itself about its Being in 
order to find out the meaning of that Being. That Dasein asks the 
question implies both that it already has a relation to that Being, 
and that this relation implies a particular—though indeterminate— 
understanding. That Dasein asks itself the question implies that, in 
a sense, it already has an answer to the question, albeit an obscured 
one. In asking itself about its own Being, Dasein hopes to bring to 
light the meaning of Being overall. Heidegger aims to show that 
the horizon against which Being can appear as a phenomenon is 
time. Given this, we can understand the existential analytic as 
follows. The first division, which deals with Dasein in its average 
everydayness, discloses Dasein as the entity which has a pre-
ontological understanding of Being. Heidegger must demonstrate 
both who Dasein is such that asking the Seinsfrage is a possibility 
of its Being, and that Dasein does indeed have anything like an 
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understanding of Being, albeit a mostly empty one. The first 
division maps out the formal indications with respect to Dasein 
which must be confirmed in the second division, where Heidegger 
must show how Dasein's empty intention of its own Being can be 
fulfilled. He must demonstrate how Dasein's Being can be disclosed 
to it in a way that gives evidence for what it emptily intends in 
everydayness. This disclosure must occur through a type of 
phenomenological reduction in which Dasein's Being is uncovered 
and becomes more explicitly an issue for it. It occurs when the 
meaning of Dasein's own Being is thrown into question against 
the horizon of its own death. Being-towards-death is what 
phenomenologically reveals Dasein's Being to it as such. The 
meaning of Dasein's Being is mortality, which derives its sense 
from a more general understanding of Being in terms of 
temporality. 4 2 
This understanding of Dasein's subjectivity and of the concepts 
of authenticity and inauthenticity emerges when the Dasein analytic 
is situated relative to the project of the Seinsfiage. This has been 
done here through a reading of Heidegger's more extended 
discussion of phenomenology in HCT. This reading of Dasein's 
authenticity in terms of empty and fulfilled intentionality, which is 
only further refined in Heidegger's characterization of Dasein as 
the entity who questions, highlights the features of Dasein's 
subjectivity which differentiate it significantly from the more 
traditional metaphysical subjectivity promoted by the existentialist-
voluntarist position. 
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its Being. Thus, it comports itself toward possibility without grasping 
itself as possibility (SZ 261-63). 
34. This aids us in understanding Heidegger's claim that authentic-
ity and inauthenticity are modes of Dasein's mineness (SZ 53). 
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35. "It is peculiar to this entity [Dasein] that with and through its 
Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a 
determination of Being [eine Seinsbestimmtheit] of Dasein" (SZ 12). Note 
that Macquarrie and Robinson translate "Seinsbestimmtheit" as "a defi-
nite character". 
36. "We thus have a very distinctive questioning inasmuch as in the 
content of the question, in what is asked for, what is asked for is itself 
what the questioning itself is. What is asked for in it, the sense of being, 
is thereby given in all indeterminacy, as indeterminate as only what is 
sought can be" (HCT 147). 
37. "In conscience Dasein calls itself (SZ 275). 
38. "The caller is Dasein in its uncanniness ... the caller is unfamil-
iar to the everyday they-self' (SZ 276-277). 
39. Though the other which calls Dasein in the call of conscience is 
Dasein's self, it is Dasein's self in its alterity. Even in the case where one 
asks oneself a question, there is a sense in which the self who asks is 
"other" than the self who answers, otherwise there would be no need for 
the question in the first place. 
40. It has priority at the ontic level because it is the only entity who 
exists (i.e. comports itself toward Being) and at the ontological level be-
cause this existence is ontologically constitutive of this entity (SZ 8-15). 
41. The question of the meaning of Being shows up ontically for 
Dasein as the question of the meaning of Dasein's Being. What is the 
meaning of existence in the face ofthat which questions it, namely death? 
42. "Our analysis of Dasein [in the first division], however is not 
only incomplete; it is also, in the first instance, provisional. It merely 
brings out the Being of this entity, without interpreting its meaning. It is 
rather a preparatory procedure by which the horizon for the most primor-
dial way of interpreting Being may be laid bare. Once we have arrived at 
that horizon, this preparatory analytic of Dasein will have to be repeated 
on a higher and authentically ontological basis" (SZ 17). 
